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Introduction
The recent decision of the European Union (EU) at the Copenhagen summit to give Turkey a conditional date for accession review was less than what the Turkish government had hoped for.  Previously at the Helsinki summit, the decision of the EU to include Turkey among the list of candidate countries for membership has eased tensions in the capitols of Western Allies.  After two years of very cold relations the two sides seem to be moving toward better days.  As a candidate for membership, Turkey has attained recognition from its European neighbors that it belongs in the European club of states – a status sought by Turkish and Ottoman governments for almost 150 years.  However, unlike in the case of other candidate countries, accession talks were not to begin until Turkey completed a series of economic and political reforms.  During the last year and a half, the Turkish governments succeeded in passing series of amendments to the Turkish Constitution and had hoped that the EU would grant Turkey a solid date in 2004, if not in 2003, for the start of accession negotiations.  However, the outcome of the Copenhagen summit was to tell the Turks that their progress on democratization would be reviewed in December 2004.  If at that time Turkish progress on Copenhagen criteria is judged favorably, the Commission would recommend start of accession negotiations without any further delay.​[1]​ This paper evaluates the nature of EU-Turkey relations in the context of the Union’s eastern enlargement and assesses Turkey’s prospects for eventual membership in the Union.

Eastern Enlargement of the EU and Turkey’s Place
At the Essen meeting of the European Council during December 9–10, 1994, the EU leaders agreed to prepare six central and eastern European countries (CEEC: Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Bulgaria, and Romania) for accession to full membership.​[2]​ While the EU made this commitment, it also stated that accession negotiations with these countries would not start until after the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference to review the state of the Maastricht Treaty. Since then, the EU has been proceeding ahead with a complex set of assistance policies aimed at preparing first 11, and now 13, CEEC states for membership.
The first 12 countries are the ones identified at the Luxembourg 1998 summit of the European Council in a two-phase enlargement plan. The first phase would include Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Malta, Poland, and Slovenia. The second phase would include Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, and Slovakia. Malta reentered the picture in February 1999, and at the Helsinki summit in December 1999, the European Council invited Turkey to be a candidate but without committing to accession talks until the Turks meet the Copenhagen criteria for membership. At the EU summit in Nice (December 4–6, 2000), the member states reaffirmed their commitment to enlargement and outlined institutional changes that will take place after enlargement such as changing votes of the Council and seats in the EP (see below, this chapter).​[3]​  The Nice Treaty initially ran into a problem in Ireland when the Irish voters rejected it in a national referendum in 2001.  After a yearlong intense campaign by the Irish government, the voters revisited the Nice Treaty in a new referendum on October 19, 2000 and gave it a 63 percent thumbs up.

Assessing the reasons behind enlargement.  
As stated earlier, when we assess the reasons behind this ambitious enlargement plan, it becomes clear that, with the end of the Cold War, the EU and CEECs had no real alternative but to reach out to each other. The CEECs needed to achieve market reforms, integrate their economies with global financial markets, and build democratic institutions. EU membership provides the easiest possible way to achieve these objectives. On the other hand, the CEECs represent new market opportunities that would increase the EU’s sole power in the new international economic order by making it the largest economic bloc. Agenda 2000 further elaborates on these issues by identifying three challenges facing the EU at the end of the current century:
	1.	How to strengthen and reform the EU’s policies so that they can deal with enlargement and deliver sustainable growth, higher employment, and improved living conditions for Europe’s citizens
	2.	How to negotiate enlargement while at the same time vigorously preparing all applicant countries for the moment of accession
	3.	How to finance enlargement, the advance preparations and the development of the EU’s internal policies​[4]​
The EU citizens generally support these plans. According to the Eurobarometer survey number 56, 51 percent of EU citizens support enlargement.  The highest level of support was in Greece with 74 percent followed by Denmark and Sweden with 69 percent respectively.  In five countries, the level of support for enlargement was below the EU average. These were Belgium – 49 percent, Germany – 47 percent, Austria – 46 percent, Britain – 41 percent, and France – 39 percent.​[5]​ Moreover, 68 percent believed that enlargement would make the EU a more important actor in world affairs and 64 percent viewed enlargement as contributing to the cultural richness of the EU and more peace and security in Europe.​[6]​  However, their view of candidate countries varied greatly (see Table 1).

[Table 1 Here]

Support is highest for Malta and ranges from 72 percent in Greece to 36 percent in France. The next highest support is for four other first-wave countries (Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland, but not for Slovenia). Support for Hungary ranges from 65 percent in Denmark and Sweden to 36 percent in France, while for Poland support ranges from 70 percent in Denmark to 23 percent in Austria. The support for Cyprus is highest in Greece, as expected—88 percent. France and Germany present the lowest support for Cyprus at 32 percent. Support for Turkey is the lowest among all of the candidate countries. Only 34 percent of EU citizens are in favor of Turkey’s membership, and the support ranges from 44 percent in Ireland to 20 percent in Germany.​[7]​ 
Finally, it is important to note EU citizens’ views on the conditions for membership for candidate countries. The surveyors presented the respondents with a list of statements pertaining to the Copenhagen criteria. Table 2 presents these results.

[Table 2 Here]
It is against these realities that the EU has assessed the accession prospects of the candidates in Commission’s 2001 and 2002 reports.  

Accession Requirements
	Membership criteria as outlined in various EU documents are summarized as the Copenhagen Criteria.
	1.	Europeanness: The applicant country has to be a member of the European family of states.
	2.	Political criteria: The political system must be characterized by democracy and the rule of law, respect of human rights, and protection of minorities.
	3.	Economic criteria: The country must have a strong market economy that encompasses the free movement of goods, capital, services, and people.
	4.	Other obligations
	a.	The aims of political, economic, and monetary union.
	b.	Adoption of the acquis communautaire, the rights and obligations derived from EU treaties, laws, and regulations over the years.​[8]​
Acquis communautaire is one of the main requirements for membership in the EU. The requirements are quite specific about what conditions candidate countries must meet prior to accession. Furthermore, the EU leaders are quite clearly committed to preparing these countries for membership.
Assessing the Candidates. 
The two most recent Commission Reports (2001 and 2002) on enlargement show satisfactory progress in the area of democratization among the first-wave CEEC candidates (Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia), though there are lingering problems concerning the slowness of the legal system (the Czech Republic, Estonia, Poland, and Slovenia). There are some problems with the independence of the judiciary in Slovakia, and with minorities in Latvia (Russians), Hungary (Romanians), the Czech Republic (Gypsies), Bulgaria (Turks), Romania (Hungarians and Gypsies), Cyprus (Turks), and Turkey (Kurds). The second-tier countries still had problems with democratic reforms. Among this group the Turkish case is by far the most serious as its candidacy agreement does not open the door for accession talks until Turkey meets certain conditions outlined by the EU.
In terms of their economic readiness for EU membership, all of the candidates with the exception of Bulgaria and Romania have met most of the necessary economic structural reforms for membership. Among these first wave countries, Cyprus and Malta have small and highly developed market economies so that would not be costly to integrate their economies with the EU. However, the present political division of Cyprus, the existence of constitutional issues that require both Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities’ willingness to join any international body, and the veto power Turkey claims over Cyprus’s EU membership (due to the Treaty of Guarantee) present serious obstacles for this country’s accession to EU membership.​[9]​ Delicate diplomatic efforts are currently underway to find a fair and just resolution of this problem.
The Turkish Case. 
The case of Turkish application for membership is a complex one and deserves special attention because of its significance to the EU’s other interests—the Cyprus problem for one, and the future of the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI). Turkey applied for EU membership in 1987, and on May 18, 1989, the European Commission concluded that the EU was not ready to enter into accession talks with Turkey because the Turkish economy was not as developed as the EU’s, the Turkish democracy lacked extensive individual civil and political rights, and unemployment in Turkey posed a serious threat to the EU markets.​[10]​ An additional and very serious problem in Turkey’s case was the ongoing Greek-Turkish conflicts over Cyprus, territorial waters, the Aegean airspace, the continental shelf, and the rights of the Greek and Turkish minorities in their respective countries. Given the extent of this conflict, Greece would veto Turkey’s membership in the EU even if the latter were to meet all the conditions for membership.
However, all was not lost after this initial European response. Recognizing Turkey’s economic and political significance for the EU following the end of the Cold War, European leaders began a series of talks with their Turkish counterparts that eventually resulted in a compromise solution that neither shut the door on future membership nor granted the Turks immediate accession. The outcome was the customs union agreement of 1995 that went into effect on December 31, 1995.​[11]​ This agreement gave the Turks closer economic ties with the EU than any other nonmember country at the time, with the exception of Iceland, Norway and Switzerland, and opened the Turkish market of 65 million consumers to EU companies. For the Turks, the customs union symbolized their membership in Europe and thus put Turkey on track for membership in the EU. For the EU members, however, the customs union was the most Turkey could expect from the EU for the foreseeable future.
The next crucial event in EU-Turkey relations came at the Luxembourg summit of December 1997. At this summit, the EU leaders decided on the list of candidate countries for membership in line with the recommendations of the European Commission outlined earlier in Agenda 2000. The announcement excluded Turkey as a candidate country. The Turkish government reacted harshly on several fronts. First, it announced that it no longer viewed the EU as a third-party mediator in Greek-Turkish affairs and the Cyprus problem. Second, the Turkish government vetoed European allies’ ESDI plans on agenda setting in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). And finally, on the economic front Turkey decided not to purchase military hardware from EU states.
Relations between the two sides were extremely tense and it was clear that something had to be done to improve this situation. Not only was Turkey moving away from the EU; several important foreign policy and security matters on NATO’s agenda were deadlocked. These included lack of progress on Cyprus, the Aegean, and the future reformulation of NATO-ESDI relations. Greek-Turkish relations also reached a low point in early 1999 after the capture of the separatist Kurdish leader Abdullah Ocalan by Turkish special forces in Kenya as he was leaving the Greek ambassador’s residence.
The initiative for a possible solution to the EU-Turkish problem came from the Clinton administration. These efforts gained added momentum after the devastating earthquakes in Turkey in August 1999 and also occurring to lesser degree, in Greece, when the peoples of the two countries began a series of bilateral goodwill initiatives. The governments of Greece and Turkey, led by their respective foreign ministers, seized this opportunity and started building cooperation in many technical areas such as tourism and drug trafficking. The first sign of improvement came when the Commission recommended to the Council that Turkey be included as a formal candidate but without any definite time set for the start of accession talks. The European Council meeting at Helsinki in December 1999 followed these recommendations and invited Turkey to join the CEEC candidates. After intense diplomatic pressure the EU and Turkey came to an agreement, with the understanding that both sides will work in an atmosphere of goodwill to settle disputes between them. The lifting of the Greek veto was the most significant issue in this compromise. In return, Turkey agreed to the EU’s statement that it will adapt to the acquis and work with Greece to resolve disputes between the two countries and Cyprus; and the EU agreed to review progress on these fronts by the end of 2004. The EU stated that if Greek-Turkish problems were not resolved by the set date, the Commission would consider recommending taking the problems to the Hague Court for resolution, though this is not a binding statement.
Turkey responded to the EU by presenting its National Program, a detailed report on economic and political reform plans, on March 19, 2001.​[12]​  This five hundred-page document outlined how Turkey intended to carry out specific reforms to meet the requirements of the acquis.  In this document, the Turkish government provided its plans for economic, social, and technical reforms to harmonize Turkey’s policies with those of the Union. However, the response to EU’s call for political reforms remained vague and raised concerns among European political circles.  
In reality, the nature of the National Program reflected the delicate balance of the coalition government in Ankara at the time.  While Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit (Democratic Left Party) and his junior coalition partner Mesut Yılmaz (Motherland Party) favored listing concrete reforms with deadlines, the other main coalition partner Devlet Bahçeli (Nationalist Action Party) and the powerful military argued in favor of a more gradual approach to satisfying political reforms. Another factor that took away the limelight from political reforms was the financial crisis of February-March 2001 that led to Turkey’s adoption of an IMF sponsored economic program.  
At the European Council summit of Göteborg in June 2001, EU leaders noted economic and political difficulties facing Turkey.  The Council stressed the importance of the economic program agreed between Turkey and the IMF and urged its vigorous implementation for economic recovery.  However, the EU leaders explained that in a number of areas, such as human rights and treatment of the minorities, Turkey’s National Program left much room for improvement.  The Council urged Turkish leaders to take concrete measures to implement the priorities in the Accession Partnership as this represents the cornerstone of the pre-accession strategy.​[13]​  
The Turkish government responded recently in October 2001 in an unanticipated move by proposing 37 sweeping amendments to the Constitution.  The National Assembly voted to pass 34 amendments that signals Turkey’s commitment to meet democratization requirements of EU membership.​[14]​  Despite these reforms, the road to membership, however, is not an easy one for both Turkey and the EU.  
Despite these developments, EU-Turkish relations once again took a turn for the worse with most recent recommendation of the Commission on enlargement that gives Turkey no definitive timetable for starting accession talks.​[15]​ The report makes up the bases of the 2002 accession assessment of the candidates and serves as a guideline for the European Council summit in Copenhagen in December 2002.  According to the Commission, the other 12 mostly ex-communist countries had substantial progress in their reforms efforts to warrant membership in the Union.  Ten countries will become members in 2004 and two others, Bulgaria and Romania, will join them in 2007.​[16]​  This conclusion of the Commission drew criticism form Turkish officials for two reasons.  First, the Turkish parliament had passed substantial reforms of the constitution to satisfy the EU’s political acquis standards in September 2002.  And second, the Commission’s position on Cyprus’s membership is seen as a pro-Greek policy that ignores Turkey’s and Turkish Cypriots’ treaty rights over Cyprus’s membership in international organizations/ institutions. 
The final outcome of the 2002 Copenhagen summit was to invite ten candidates to join the EU in 2004, Bulgaria and Romania in 2007, and to reassess Turkey’s progress in December 2004 with the understanding that if this country satisfies the acquis, accession talks would commence without delay.

Where Does Turkey Stand with the Copenhagen Criteria?
	Among the three main criteria (Europeanness, economic development, and democratisation) the candidacy for membership should settle the debate over Turkey’s Europeanness.​[17]​ However, regardless of this conclusion there will always be those who will continue this debate. In this section the other two criteria will be considered.

Economic Criteria:
	On the economic front, Turkey has come a long way since the Özal decade of restructuring in the 1980s.  It moved away from inward looking import substitution growth to an open market economy.  Today, Turkey has the sixteenth largest economy in the world and has a dynamic private sector that competes successfully in world markets.  In addition, the Turkish economy has successfully integrated with the world financial markets and the Istanbul Stock Exchange (ISE) remains a star among emerging markets.  Despite significant developments since 1980, Turkey is far from meeting the Euro criteria (the earlier Economic and Monetary Union requirements) for economic integration with the EU.  The Commission reports made this clear both in 1998 and 1999 and the Accession Partnership agreement outlined what Turkey had to accomplish prior to membership.  Following recent financial crisis in February 2001, Turkey’s report card has become even worse.  In this regard, the reform package outlined by Economic Minister Kemal Derviş was particularly important for meeting EU targets for economic integration.
The EU and Turkey have a long and important economic partnership.  The EU continues to be Turkey’s primary trade and investment partner.  Roughly fifty percent of Turkey’s foreign trade is with the Union.  Germany is the largest partner accounting for an average of 20-25 percent of annual exports and 15-18 percent of annual imports.​[18]​  Since the CU entered into force, more European companies have invested in Turkey than any other country of origin.  According to the State Planning Organization, fdi by French companies reached a cumulative figure of $5.2 billion by the end of 1998.  Other investments were: Germany $2.7 billion, the Netherlands $2.7 billion, United Kingdom $1.7 billion, and Italy $1.5 billion.  In comparison, American firms fdi was $2.7 billion.  As structural reforms proceed and privatisation measures pass the National Assembly, more fdi is expected to flow into the country.  Turkey’s regional economic importance as a bridge between European markets and Central Asia also add to the attractiveness of Turkey for foreign investments.  
Following recent financial crisis in Turkey economic indicators took a turn to the worse and moved Turkey further away from meeting the economic criteria of membership requirements (see Table 3).  While it is not the purpose of this paper to provide a detailed assessment of Turkey’s recent economic crisis, it should suffice to note that the crisis in the banking sector led to near financial bankruptcy of Turkey and required a massive bailout under IMF auspices.  This crisis followed a textbook sequence of event that were previously observed in other emerging market countries – Mexico in 1994, Thailand, Indonesia and South Korea in 1997, Russia and Brazil in 1998, and Argentina in 2000.  The cost of the crisis to the Turkish banking sector was $20 billion (State owned banks) with a total exposure of commercial banks standing at $43.9 billion.​[19]​  In addition, some $7.5 billion fled Turkey’s portfolio market during the first 48 hours of the crisis.​[20]​  During the first 48 hours of the crisis, some $7.5 billion fled the country from portfolio investments at the Istanbul Stock Exchange.  In addition, the government’s decision to switch the monetary policy to the free-float system resulted in a 48 percent devaluation of the Turkish lira against the US dollar. The expected cost of the crisis and economic restructuring for the Turkish economy is:  GNP will fall by 4-5 percent in 2001 and is expected to enter the positive figures (est. 5 percent in 2002 and 6 percent in 2003), inflation to rise to 75 percent in 2001 and fall to 20 percent in 2002, and the public sector borrowing requirement will increase to 17 percent of GDP in 2001.  The consolidated net public debt will increase to 79 percent of GNP form 58 percent in 2000 due to foreign exchange crisis and banking restructuring that required new borrowing from the IMF and the World Bank.

[Table 3 here]

	Given the magnitude of the economic crisis in Turkey success in joining the EU depends on Turks putting their economic house in order so that the Turkish economy would not become a large burden on the member states.  Structural reforms outlined by the former coalition government seem to be the only hope for recovery at this time.  Main points of these reforms include reorganizing the banking sector, increased financial transparency to eliminate government’s historical practice of extra-budget accounts, privatisation (more serious than the previous attempts under earlier governments), fight against corruption, and structural adjustments in economic sectors to attract direct foreign investment.​[21]​  How well the new AKP government performs along these lines is yet to be seen.

Political Criteria
	The political requirements for accession stipulate that any candidate country must have achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities.”​[22]​  In a previous study, I concluded that: 
Despite positive developments, Turkey’s prospects for membership still face a difficult road ahead.  Reasons are complex and require delicate handling by the officials on both sides.  First, the slow pace of democratization in Turkey remains a serious concern for the EU.  The acquis calls for complete harmonization of the legal systems and stresses adherence to European human rights declaration.  Yet, there is progress being made albeit at snail pace.  The Turkish military and conservative politicians fear that separatist groups would use extensive political freedoms to endanger the unity of the country.  The two main parties they identify are the Kurds and the Islamists.  Nonetheless, membership in the EU will cannot be achieved unless Turkey undertakes major political reforms that provide extensive individual civil and political rights to its citizens.  To their credit, the Turkish leaders are facing these challenges as noted in recent amendments to the Constitution.  While these reforms still do not meet the entire spectrum of changes expected by the EU, they are nonetheless impressive.  In a matter of two weeks, the Turkish leaders have achieved more in democratization than they have in the previous two years.​[23]​

The positive developments referred to constitutional amendments that previous Turkish governments succeeded in passing through the National Assembly. Gradually, the Turks have been amending the 1982 Constitution to rid it of the authoritarian articles that restrict individual civil and political rights.  In July 1995, the National Assembly passed amendments to 15 articles of the constitution easing the restrictions on individual civil and political rights.  Among these, the important changes included:
1.	The right of trade unions to engage in political activity (Arts. 33 & 52).
2.	The right of civil servants to join trade unions (Art. 53).
3.	The lowering of the voting age to 18 (Arts. 67 & 68).
4.	Permitting professional organizations to engage in politics (Art. 135), and
5.	Permitting university staff and students to engage in politics (Arts. 67 & 68).
	However, six other amendments were defeated which drew criticism from the EP members and human rights groups and pro-democracy politicians in Turkey.  These amendments would have made it more difficult for the government to ban strikes, allowed strikes by civil servants, and withdrawn the present immunity from persecution of former members of the military government of 1980-83.​[24]​  More alarming was that the government failed to amend Article 8 of the Law for the Suppression of Terrorism.  Until recently when the National Assembly passed sweeping reforms to the Constitution, this article made even a verbal support of Kurdish nationalism a crime against the state.  It was this law that the State used as basis for punishing the six ex-DEP/HADEP (pro-Kurdish Democracy Party--closed down in 1994) members of the National Assembly.  These parliamentarians received long prison sentences.  Reforms of October 2001 eased this restriction on Kurdish identity and language but maintained strict ban on activities that threatened the country.  In fact, these reforms strengthened guarantees in the field of human rights and fundamental freedoms and limiting capital punishment.  Furthermore, the Turkish National Assembly adopted a new Civil Code in November 2001 and three sets of comprehensive reform packages were adopted in February, March, and August 2002.  Among these reforms, those adopted in August 2002 were far reaching: lifting of the death penalty in peace time, the possibility for Radio and TV broadcasting in Kurdish, the expanding of freedom of expression and greater freedom for non-Muslim religious minorities (particularly in expansion of their property rights).  The National Security Council recommended lifting of the state of emergency in Southeastern Turkey.  Other areas of substantial improvements in Turkish legal system included:

1.	Reform of the prison system, creation of the Monitoring Boards and a new system of enforcement judges became operational.
2.	Reduction in the length of pre-trial detention (police custody).
3.	Provision for retrial of individuals whose convictions have been found by the European Court of Human Rights to be in violation of the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.
4.	Change in Article 159 of the Penal Code meant that the expression of opinion without the “intention” of “insulting” public institutions would no longer face criminal sanction.
5.	Changes to Article 312 of the Penal Code and to the Anti-Terror Law, the Press Law, the Law on Political Parties and the Law of Associations eased some restrictions on freedom of expression, association, the press and broadcasting.
6.	The new Civil Code provides more gender equality and strengthens guarantees for the protection and rights of the child.
7.	Turkey also ratified the 1969 UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.​[25]​

Yet, the reforms failed to convince the EU to grant Turkey a firm date for the start of accession talks.  So where does Turkey stand with the democratization criteria for membership?
	The EU response to drastic improvements in Turkey’s constitutional and legal system through the above reforms has been “now we need to see implementation process.”  Furthermore, the EU identified several shortcomings in areas of individual rights, continued cases of torture, independence of the judiciary (some cases), continued prosecution of writers, journalists, and publishers, corruption in the public sector, and strong influence of the military in the National Security Council.​[26]​  

Conclusions and Prospects
	It is quite arguable that Turkey favors favorably against other CEEC in democratic reforms and has a dynamic market economy that is on the road to recovery. Despite these realities, it is being told to wait until the December 2004 review before it can find out its prospects for membership.  On the economic front recent troubles crisis of the Turkish economy present a clear obstacle to membership in the near future.  Turkey needs to carry out the IMF-led reforms and bring its economy out of recession.  Currently, Turkey’s budget deficit, public debt, inflations rate, unemployment rate, and interest rates fall far short of EU targets for participation in the Euro zone.  Absorbing the Turkish economy is financially impossible for the EU at this time.  This is probably one of the top reasons for the EU to keep Turkey at an arms length.
	On the political front Turkey has made substantial improvements and deserves recognition of its hard efforts.  However, there are areas of shortcomings as noted above.  These include restrictions in freedom of expression (written press and broadcasting), shortcomings in the fight against torture and ill treatment, civilian control of the military, and continued imprisonment of individuals for expressing non-violent opinions.
	Given the fact that these issues can be settled during accession talks, what are the other factors that can keep Turkey at an arms length from membership?  One can identify three main issues.  First is the economic cost of Turkey’s accession.  As the poorest member of the Union, Turkey would qualify for funds from all the cohesion fund program of the EU leaving all current recipients in the cold.  Second, as the poorest member of the EU, Turkey will have as much presence as Germany in EU institutions (votes in the Council of Ministers, the European Parliament, Commission).  Third, Greek-Turkish problems will stand in the way of Turkey’s membership. Even though these issues were not discussed in this paper, since they do not pertain to issues of the Copenhagen criteria, they represent real obstacles for Turkey.  The Cyprus problem, unless resolved before this country joins the EU, will contribute to worsening of relations between Turkey and the EU.  At the very minimum Turkey may find itself in a position of “occupying” EU territory.  Moreover, legal cases brought against Turkey by the Greek Cypriots (e.g. Loizidou case) at the ECHR will multiply in number by the thousands and cause further tension between the two.  
	
	


Table 1  EU 15 Public Support for Membership of Candidate Countries
Candidate Country	In Favor (%)	Against (%)	No Opinion (%)
Bulgaria	38	40	22
Cyprus	46	33	21
Czech Republic	45	34	21
Estonia	40	38	22
Hungary	50	30	20
Latvia	39	38	23
Lithuania	39	38	23
Malta	51	28	21
Poland	47	34	19
Romania	36	42	24
Slovakia	37	43	20
Slovenia	37	40	23
Turkey	34	46	20
Source: Eurobarometer 56 Fig. 6.6a, p. 78.
Table 2  Importance of Copenhagen Criteria for Accession of Candidate Countries
Statement on Enlargement Criteria	Important (%)	Not Important (%)	No Opinion (%)
1.	The country has to respect human	95	2	3
	rights and the principles of
	democracy
2.	It has to fight organized crime	92	3	5
	and drug trafficking
3.	It has to protect the environment	92	4	4
4.	It has to be able to pay its share	85	8	7
	of the EU budget
5.	Its joining should not be costly	81	11	8
	for existing member countries
6.	It has to accept the acquis:	82	 9	9
	whatever has already been decided
	and put into place throughout the
	process of building Europe
7.	Its level of economic development	77	15	8
	should be close to that of other
	member states
8.	It has to be prepared to put the	72	16	12
	interests of the EU above its own
SOURCE: Eurobarometer 56, Fig. 6.6, p. 77.


Table 3:  Selected Indicators for Turkey, 1999-2002

							
Turkey: Selected Indicators, 1999-2004

 	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004

 	(In percent)
Real sector	 	 	 	 	 	 
Real GNP growth rate	-6.1	6.3	-9.4	3.0	5.0	5.0
GNP deflator	55.8	50.9	57.8	48.9	24.9	13.1
Nominal GNP growth rate	...	60.4	42.9	53.4	31.2	18.8
WPI (12-month, end-of-period )	62.9	32.7	88.6	31.0	16.2	12.0
CPI (12-month, end-of period)	68.8	39.0	68.5	35.0	20.0	12.0
Average nominal treasury bill interest rate	106.2	38.0	99.7	69.6	46.0	32.4
Average ex-ante real interest rate 1/	32.0	-9.4	32.4	33.2	27.5	20.5
 	 	 	 	 	 	 
 	(In percent of GNP)
Central government budget	 	 	 	 	 	 
Primary balance 2/	1.5	4.2	4.6	5.4	5.6	5.6
Net interest payments 3/	13.1	15.8	24.3	20.5	16.2	13.5
Overall balance	-11.6	-11.6	-19.7	-15.2	-10.6	-7.8
Consolidated public sector	 	 	 	 	 	 
Primary balance 	-2.0	2.3	5.7	6.5	6.5	6.5
Net interest payments 4/	22.1	21.9	27.1	18.4	15.8	13.3
PSBR (including CBT profits)	24.2	19.6	21.2	11.9	9.3	6.8
Net debt of public sector	61.0	57.4	92.8	81.3	73.3	69.4
Net external	20.1	18.3	37.1	35.1	30.6	28.5
Net domestic	40.9	39.1	55.7	46.2	42.7	40.9
Of which:	 	 	 	 	 	 
Central government (gross) 	42.5	40.9	70.3	54.2	...	...
Auctioned and other cash debt	25.8	23.4	25.3	23.1	...	...
Bank recapitalization	...	17.4	35.6	28.4	...	...
External sector	 	 	 	 	 	 
Current account balance	-0.7	-4.9	2.3	-1.2	-1.2	-1.2
Gross external debt	55.0	56.6	78.6	71.7	66.7	63.3
Net external debt	34.0	37.0	53.7	48.1	44.4	40.8
Short-term external debt (by remaining maturity)	20.8	23.0	21.7	20.4	19.0	18.8
Monetary aggregates	 	 	 	 	 	 
Seignorage 5/	3.2	1.8	1.1	1.0	0.7	...
Nominal growth of broad liquidity (in percent)	96.9	40.2	87.5	40.2	27.4	17.1
 	 	 	 	 	 	 
 	 	(In billions of U.S. dollars, unless otherwise indicated)
Privatization proceeds	0.1	3.3	2.8	1.5	2.5	1.0
Net external financing of central government	1.4	4.1	-2.0	1.0	-1.0	-1.0
Amortization	6.0	6.2	7.8	6.5	8.4	8.0
Gross borrowing 	7.4	10.3	5.8	7.4	7.5	7.0
Of which: Eurobond issues	5.0	7.5	2.2	2.5	4.5	4.7
GNP	187.4	201.3	146.5	165.6	183.0	201.3
GNP (in quadrillions of Turkish lira)	78.3	125.6	179.5	283.2	371.6	441.3

Sources: Data provided by Turkish authorities; and IMF staff estimates.  IMF Press Release, No. 02/ June, 2002.
1/ Average of monthly nominal interest rate divided by 12-month ahead CPI inflation. With average maturity of newly issued debt less than one year, and with FRNs paying quarterly coupons, this measure overstates the effective real interest rate when inflation is declining.
2/ On a commitment basis, excluding profit transfers from the CBT, interest receipts, and privatization proceeds.
3/ Interest payments minus interest receipts plus profit transfers from the central bank.
4/ Interest payments minus interest receipts plus CBT profits before transfers to the government. 
5/ Change in reserve money in percent of GNP, where reserve money is defined as currency issued plus reserve requirements.
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